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Introduction
he National Reconnarssance Office (NRO) was created on August 25,1960, after months of debate among White House, the Central Intelhgence Agency (CIA), the Au Force and the Defense Department officials. Its mandate was to design, acquire and manage photoreconnaissance systems For about three decades the agency was concealed from public view, and notably, it WY also shrelded from much scrutrny from within the Department of Defense and the Intelligence l 1 Commuruty Decades later, the agency is no longer shrouded m absolute security, and the nature of ~~ n its internal politics and changes m rts relations with the Department of Defense, the rmlrtary Services, national pohcymakers and the U S Congress are becommg apparent
The KRO IS a classic example of the bureaucratic politics model as described by Kozak, Halperrn and others Although the agency IS fairly unique m its rrnssron and its secrecy, it exhibits ordinary bureaucratic behavior with regard to its internal pohtlcs and m Its relations with other Govemrnent em&es -Most of David Kozak's twelve "substantive pomts" about the behavior of bureaucratic organrzatrons are very accurate descriptions of the XRO, and six of them appear to be parttcularly relevant As tailored to this drscussion, they are.
1 The hR0 is made up of two separate bureaucracies, each of which IS driven by agency specific Interests 2 The bureaucracies that make up the hR0 are mvolved in long-term competition and struggles for various stakes and prizes with each other The NRO as an agency is also m competition with other agencies 3. Competition within the agency has developed mto a pattern of struggle 4 Pohcymakmg within the organization--and the pohcy applied to it--is governed by bureaucratic polmcs and is characterized by bargammg, accommodatron and compromise 5 The XRO has enJoyed the support and trust of Its clients m the U S Government, this past record is part of its bureaucratic strategy 6 Current proposals for organrzatlonal change and reform are pohcy motivated and are a source of polmcal pressure, conflict and mrmorl >Ir Kozak's points are good descriptors of the past and present and are hkely to be good predictors of the future This paper will elaborate on these six pomts (hereafter referred to by number and with a "shorthand" descnptlon) and describe, first, how bureaucratic polmcs played m the establishment of the NRO, second, the organrzatronal pohhcs that dominated rts existence for about three decades, and finally, the current pohtrcal envrronment m whrch the hR0 operates.
The Creation and Concealment of an Agency
The Katronal Reconnaissance Office was an mnovatron of the Eisenhower Adrmrnstratlon, that was born out of a combmation of bureaucratrc pohtrcs and top-pnonty natronal security concerns The President was greatly concerned with national secunty and mtelhgence programs (, c and used the bureaucratic machinery to assrst hrm m solvmg the'problems that hmtted his ability to reach his national security goals Two separate studres undertaken dunng the later years of his Admunstratron pointed to the need for him to create the NRO Frrst, President Eisenhower established a "blue ribbon" panel of experts1 to consider options for preventmg a surprise nuclear attack on the United States from the Soviet Union (Burrows, 66) Reportmg back to the President m 1955, the group offered then view of the c-uef national secunty concern* " we must find ways to Increase the number of hard facts upon which our mtelhgence estimates are based, to provide better strategic wammg, to mmmuze surpnse rn the kmd of attack, and to reduce the danger of gross overestrmatron or gross underestlmatron of the threat To thus end, we recommend adoptron of a vigorous program for the extensive use, m many mtelhgence procedures of the most advanced knowledge n-r scrence and technology" (Burrows, 67) A second study was led by Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to review the organrzatron of the Government's mtelhgence apparatus and propose changes The Defense Secretary was reacting out of frustration wrth "feuding, self indulgence, waste of time and resources " that characterized the "entu-e Defense mtelhgence establishment," but space reconnarssance programs 1 Known as the Technologxal Capabllmes Panel It was headed by James R Kllhan, Jr , of hlIT, and included other notables such as Ecwm H Land of Polarold and James G Baker, the Harvard astronomer and opucs expert who had done the highly mnovatlve lens wori for George Gocdard / 3 in part.ic&u Among other things, the panel recommended creating an organization to centrahze management and coordmate reconnaissance programs (Burrows, 13 1)2 No action was ever taken to follow through on these recommendations, however, untrl the Adrnmiskratron was motivated by what proved to be a cataclysrrnc polmcal event (Burrows, 77) On May 1, 1960, the U-2 reconnaissance arrcraft that Francis Gary Powers was pllotmg o;er the Soviet Umon was shot down, with the prlot captured ahve and the airframe retrieved, for the , z Soviets to show to the worlds. Soviet Premier Nrkita Khrushchev seized the opportunity to protest' The An Force also vied to control the analysis of the data collected dunng the reconnaissance 4The reasons for the secrecy were prmclpally dnven by nauonal secunty pohcy When President Kennedy took office, he strengthened the secunty measures surrounding the 1RO not only for national security pohcy reasons but also for tactlcal reasons Interesting m terms of bureaucratic pohtlcs m of itself, he saw the need to (1) avoid public debate oter the sufficiency of U S venficatlon and momtonng capabllmes for the emerging arms control negotlatlons, (2) preserve his foreign policy options and avold vulnerablhty to a well informed opponent by denyrng him access to key mformatlon, (3) avoid divulging techrucal capabllmes as fallout from a pubk struggle between the CIA and the Ax Force over their respecnve roles m reconnaissance, (1) protect sources and methods, (5) avold embarrassing the So\ lets over collecuon capabilmes so as to mmimlze nsk of them takmg further hostile actlon to neutralize those capabllltles and (6) a\old embarrassmg less developed countries, LX lose sensm\mes uere high to U S espionage against them Du-ector of the hR0 almost since its begmnmg, explams that the SRO had few constraints upon its operatron "Those kinds of [national security] questrons that were so overwhelmmgly important to the nation rn terms of rmpactmg the strategic balance between the U S and U S S R demanded answers and so vu-tually anything that was deemed to be technically feasrble that 7Mr fir.31 was head of the Lockheed Advanced Development Corporation, or 'Skunkworks", which built the U-2 and a successor system, the SR-71 "Blackbrrc'
The Skunkworks IS known for Its success m ploneermg development and rapid productlon of adc anced technology systems under stnct secunty concxf2ons 7 these various companies would come up with to get some of those answers would essentially be done (HWJSenner, 4) " Rrchard M Brssell, Jr., who managed the early U-2 program, explained that the hR0 operated m an atmosphere of trust m its early days Accordmg to his recollectrons, not only did the trust exist between the CIA and the U S companies that were developing the systems, but also the between the CIA and Congress (Burrows, 74) The New PO~UXS of National Reconnausance
In the 1990s the polmcal environment m which the r\RO exrsts 1s substantrally different than the one rn whrch rt was for-n-red Probably the most slgmficant factor IS the actrvrst role that the U S Congress has played with regard to mtelhgence since the mid-to-late 1970s (Srmst, 6) Congress' polrtrcal agenda concerning the NRO 1s related to broad issues regarding the Congress' perspectrve, extreme budget pressures make this relatively large fund a tempting target For example, m September 1995, Senate approprrators sought to take more than Sl b&on from the "once-sacrosanct spy satelhte program" to help speed up purchases of hundreds of milhons of dollars worth of brg-trcket defense items, mcludmg the B-2 bomber (Morgan and Pmcus). The target of the raid was $1 6 b&on m "carryover funds" prevrously appropnated but unspent that *_ were carfred on the NRO books to pay future costs of launching new satellite programs8
Members of Congress are also concerned about reducing the very high expenses associated * with satellite reconnarssance (Srmth> New pohcy alternatives to funding the SRO--such as the spread of commercral Imaging technology--are provrdmg a vehrcle for mtervenmg m the budget and as Justrficatron to "chop" rt (Cole) Other pohcy developments such as the development of "small" satellites has been used as an opportumty for Congress to recommend to NRO officrals that they consider burldmg these m place of the large ones currently planned {Pmcus, 5 Ott 9.5:
Regardless of the merits of any of these proposals, some members of Congress think that KRO officials are not receptive to their proposals. Some are quack to crrtrcrze NRO officrals publicly "for tunnel vrsron and a bras agamst ideas that threaten the exrstmg program they want to follow" (Pmcus, 5 Ott 95) Thus reactron 1s highly predrctable accordmg to the bureaucratic model From the SRO's perspective, the KRP budget IS the principal means that the agency has to carry out its mrssion of satellite acquisition As such, the organrzatron 1s apt to be hrghly sensmve to decrsrons made externally concemmg Its budget and equally sensmve to pohcy decrsrons--such as whrch type of satellites should be built--because they ~111 most surely have budgeting rmphcatrons (Halpenn, and wane over time (Jeffenes, This is precisely what has occurred An independent _URO IS no longer thought to be as useful as It once was, the bureaucratic process has worked to subordlnate It more strongly to the Department of Defense Secondly, the fact that the YRO has been subordinated suggests that the agency's influence within the Defense bureaucracy 1s on the wane An altematlve interpretanon suggests that the influence of the CIA over the hR0 1s on the wane with the current Defense 
